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FITZGERALD v. UNITED STATES: SENTENCE
ENHANCEMENT STATUTES REDEFINE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY ANALYSIS
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no
"person [shall] be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb." 1 This provision, commonly called the double jeopardy clause,2
protects defendants from multiple prosecutions and sentences for the same
offense.' The double jeopardy clause, however, does not provide all-encom-
passing protection to a defendant being retried for the same offense.4 As an
example, United States Supreme Court rulings have established that the
double jeopardy clause does not normally preclude retrial of a criminal de-
fendant whose conviction is set aside because of trial error.,
The Supreme Court's double jeopardy standard states that, absent
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. The concept of double jeopardy is that a defendant should not be tried or punished
twice for the same offense. Although it is difficult to trace the double jeopardy doctrine to a
specific origin, legal historians have found that the Greeks and Romans recognized such a
precept. See Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283 (1963); See
generally Batchelder, Former Jeopardy, 17 AM. L. REV. 735 (1883).
Early canon law, which developed at the end of the Roman Empire, also opposed retrying a
person for the same act by adhering to the principle that God does not punish twice. See 1 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 448-49 (2d ed. 1899); see also
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 152 n.4 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957), the Supreme Court described the purpose underly-
ing the double jeopardy clause thus: "the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense .. " Id. at
187. The original purpose of the double jeopardy clause was to protect the integrity of a final
judgment, but there has developed a body of law allowing the protection of the double jeop-
ardy clause in two instances when there is no final judgment. See, e.g., United States v. Scott,
437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978). One instance when there is no final judgment is when a mistrial is
declared and the other is when the trial judge terminates the proceedings favorably to the
defendant without a consideration of guilt or innocence, for example, when an indictment is
found defective. Id. at 92.
4. The landmark case of United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), established that
defendants who are successful in having their convictions reversed are precluded from pleading
double jeopardy. See also Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960).
5. See Scott, 437 U.S. at 91, where the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in Tateo by
stating that to require a criminal defendant to be retried "after he has successfully invoked a
statutory right of appeal is not an act of governmental oppression of the sort against which the
double jeopardy clause was intended to protect." Id. See generally United States v. Tateo, 377
U.S. 463 (1964).
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"prosecutorial harassment or overreaching," 6 the double jeopardy clause
does not insulate a defendant from being retried after he has successfully
appealed his first conviction unless there is insufficient evidence to support
the original verdict.7 Previous decisions of the Supreme Court and the fed-
eral circuit courts of appeals have also held that a defendant who has not
fully satisfied his sentence may be retried without violating the double jeop-
ardy clause.
In a recent case of first impression, Fitzgerald v. United States,8 the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals expanded upon that sentencing principle
in a case where the defendant had already served the sentence imposed at his
first trial and, prior to retrial, had been unconditionally released from pa-
role.' Defendant Fitzgerald argued that, having been once punished for an
offense, further punishment would amount to double jeopardy. 0 The de-
fendant was indicted for assault with intent to commit rape, 1' taking inde-
cent liberties with a minor child,12 and enticing a minor child.13 At trial,
evidence was introduced that Fitzgerald took a neighbor's twelve year old
female house-guest with him on a drive to a nearby liquor store."4 On the
way back, the defendant parked in an alley, forced her to submit to cunnilin-
gus and attempted to have vaginal intercourse.15 A jury found the defendant
guilty of assault with intent to commit rape.16 The trial judge subsequently
sentenced him to a prison term of fifteen to forty-five months. 7
6. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
7. The proposition that there must be sufficient evidence to support the verdict before
retrial can be accomplished is found in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
8. 472 A.2d 52 (D.C. 1984).
9. Id. at 53.
10. Id. Cf United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 121 (1966), (where the Court relied on
Ball, 163 U.S. at 671-72, and Tateo 377 U.S. at 465, 473-74, to support its position that when a
defendant obtains reversal of a prior, unsatisfied conviction, he is not protected by the double
jeopardy clause). The defendant in Ewell had already served a substantial amount of his
prison sentence when he was retried for the same offense. Id. Despite that fact, the Supreme
Court found he could still be retried consistent with the double jeopardy clause, but that time
already served must be credited against the sentences that might be imposed on reconviction.
Id. at 123. Compare Fitzgerald, 472 A.2d 52 (D.C. 1984), with Scott, 437 U.S. at 82; United
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980); and In re Evans, 450 A.2d 443 (D.C. 1982) (in
each of these cases, the defendant had not satisfied his conviction and was denied double jeop-
ardy clause protection).
11. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-501 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
12. Id. § 22-3501 (a).
13. Id. § 22-3501 (b).
14. Fitzgerald, 472 A.2d at 53.
15. Id.
16. Id. The jury found the defendant guilty only of the one offense, even though he was
charged with two others. See supra notes 12 and 13 and accompanying text.
17. Fitzgerald, 472 A.2d at 53. Under the D.C. Code § 22-501, the maximum sentence
the defendant could have received was fifteen years.
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While serving his prison sentence, the defendant appealed the convic-
tion. 18 A panel of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, hold-
ing that while sufficient evidence had been presented to corroborate the
victim's testimony, the trial judge had committed plain error by failing to
instruct the jury that corroboration of a minor complainant's testimony is
required in sexual abuse cases.' Following this reversal, the government
petitioned the court for a rehearing en banc.
While the appeals process was running its course, Fitzgerald was serving
his sentence, and after sixteen months was released on parole.20 Two
months after his unconditional release, the Court of Appeals en banc upheld
the panel's decision and remanded the case for a new trial.2 ' Prior to retrial,
Fitzgerald's attorney moved to dismiss the indictment arguing the double
punishment aspect of the double jeopardy clause.22 The trial judge denied
the motion, and an immediate appeal followed.2 3 The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
dismiss reasoning that despite the completion of the defendant's sentence the
government still had an important interest in prosecuting him24 and, there-
fore, double jeopardy protections did not apply.25 The court held that even
where a defendant has been released from parole, there may still be legiti-
mate governmental and societal interests in obtaining findings of guilt.
26
18. Fitzgerald, 472 A.2d at 53.
19. Fitzgerald v. United States, 412 A.2d 1, 8 (D.C. 1980). This was a panel decision
which was subsequently vacated by the D.C. Court of Appeals sitting en banc. The court
reasoned that had the instruction been given, the jury's verdict might have been different,
especially since evidence of corroboration- was slight.
20. Fitzgerald, 472 A.2d at 53.
21. Fitzgerald v. United States, 443 A.2d 1295, 1305 (D.C. 1982) (en banc).
22. Fitzgerald, 472 A.2d at 53. Fitzgerald's attorney argued that double jeopardy protec-
tion was applicable to the defendant inasmuch as he would face double punishment if he were
reconvicted at another trial. Id. The defendant had already fully served the sentence imposed
at the first trial.
23. Id. at 53. Such an appeal is allowed because "a motion to dismiss an indictment on
double jeopardy grounds is a final order and thus immediately appealable." Id. at 53 n. 1. See
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977); Coleman v. United States, 414 A.2d 528 (D.C.
1980).
24. Fitzgerald, 472 A.2d at 54. The court supported its position, in part, by citing two
Supreme Court cases. First, in United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978), the Court stated that
there is a public interest in allowing a defendant a just judgment on the merits of the case. In
the second case, Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949), the Court reasoned that courts must
have the power to retry defendants since the purpose of law is to protect society from people
who are guilty of crimes. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. at 466 (the practice of retrial
serves the defendant's rights as well as society's interests).
25. Fitzgerald, 472 A.2d at 54.
26. Fitzgerald, 472 A.2d at 53-54. See infra note 52 for the D.C. Code provisions that
take a previous conviction into consideration.
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This Note will point out that public policy considerations guided the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals to ignore double punishment in its deci-
sion to permit retrial in the unique situation in which a defendant had fully
served his sentence and was unconditionally released from parole. The court
found that a defendant can be retried even though he had fully satisfied his
sentence because of the potential significant collateral consequences that
may attach to a finding of guilt in criminal cases. Specifically, the promulga-
tion of sentencing enhancement statutes has altered considerably the previ-
ously held notion that present punishment is the primary goal in a criminal
conviction. The Note concludes that Fitzgerald may be the precursor of a
trend in which sentencing enhancement statutes increasingly require the
courts to shift their focus from considering only double punishment to
weighing the public policy considerations of the effect of recorded convic-
tions on possible future punishment.
I. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE: BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF AN
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANT AGAINST THE RIGHTS OF SOCIETY
A. The Supreme Court View of Double Jeopardy: A Tool Against
Government Oppression That Does Not Provide Blanket
Protection for Defendants
The Supreme Court first addressed the double jeopardy issue in United
States v. Ball.27 In Ball, three defendants had been tried together for mur-
der; two were found guilty by the jury, while the third was acquitted.2" The
Supreme Court reversed the two convictions, concluding that the indictment
was defective.29 Thereafter, the three original defendants were reindicted.
At a second trial, all three defendants were convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death.3° On appeal, the Supreme Court established the following
basic double jeopardy tenets: first, that the double jeopardy clause precludes
a defendant from being retried who has been acquitted at the original trial,31
and second, that the double jeopardy clause does not necessarily prevent the
27. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
28. Id. at 662-64.
29. Id.
30. Id. Even the defendant who had initially been acquitted was retried.
31. See, e.g., Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962). In Fong Foo, a mandamus
order had been issued by the court of appeals, directing the district court to vacate certain
acquittals. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court acknowledged that the acquittals had been
entered erroneously, it held that retrial was barred by the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 143.
Accord United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575-76 (1977) (appellate re-
view and retrial are barred by the double jeopardy clause after a judgment of acquittal has been
entered under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29 (c)).
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retrial of defendants who have been convicted at an earlier trial.32 The Ball
principles have consistently been followed by the Supreme Court in a variety
of circumstances.33
B. The Double Punishment Bar of the Double Jeopardy Clause
With respect to double punishment,34 the United States Supreme Court,
in North Carolina v. Pearce,3" stated that under double jeopardy principles a
harsher sentence may not be imposed at a second criminal trial unless it is
justified based on the defendant's conduct since the time of the original sen-
tencing proceeding.36 Habeas corpus relief was granted by the trial court
based on a finding that a longer sentence on retrial was unconstitutional
without the requisite justification.37 Both the court of appeals and the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
While application of the Pearce rule would allow a harsher sentence on
retrial if the proper justification were present, it is limited by the well-estab-
lished proposition found in Ex parte Lange3 1 that a defendant who has suf-
32. Id. See Scott, 437 U.S. at 88-101, for a review of the history of the double jeopardy
clause in the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 84 (1978) (where the defendant obtains
termination of the proceedings, retrial does not violate the double jeopardy clause); Stroud v.
United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919) (retrial allowed after conviction reversed because of error).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has also applied the Ball principle to a double
jeopardy clause issue of retrial where a judgment has been reversed. See In re Paul G. Evans,
450 A.2d 443 (D.C. 1982). In Evans, the defendant did not suggest that he would face double
punishment if retried, rather, he argued that his contempt conviction was barred by the double
jeopardy clause because his conviction was reversed on grounds of judicial bias. Id. at 444.
The court of appeals rejected that argument by invoking the long-standing Supreme Court rule
that absent very unusual circumstances the double jeopardy clause does not protect a defend-
ant from retrial following reversal of a conviction. Id. at 442. Accord United States v. Hall,
559 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that a defendant who had served his probationary
period could be retried). Cf Williams v. Wolfe, 497 F. Supp. 122 (D. Nev. 1980), aff'd mem.,
679 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1982) (dicta suggesting that a defendant who has satisfied his sentence
may be retried).
34. See generally Note, A Definition of Punishment for Implementing the Double-Jeopardy
Clause's Multiple-Punishment Prohibition, 90 YALE L.J. 632 (1981).
35. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
36. Id. In Pearce, the Court held that a trial judge is not constitutionally precluded from
imposing a harsher sentence and may look at the defendant's "life, health, habits, conduct, and
mental and moral propensities." Id. at 723. See Barnes v. United States, 419 F.2d 753, 754
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (relying on the Pearce rule).
37. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 713-15.
38. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874). The Lange doctrine is still followed. See, e.g., United
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980). Lange was invoked in DiFrancesco for the propo-
sition that a defendant may not be sentenced to a greater length of time than the legislature has
authorized. Id. at 139. The Court avoided the Lange limitation by reasoning that the major
offender statutes under which the defendant had been sentenced were authorized by Congress.
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fered the maximum penalty cannot be punished further.39 In Lange, the
defendant had been both fined and imprisoned when the statute allowed for
either fine or imprisonment.4° The Court held that the government was
barred from seeking double punishment because the defendant, by paying
the fine, had already suffered the maximum punishment under the statute.41
C. Societal Interests as a Factor in Retrial of Defendants
The Supreme Court has posited that there are certain legitimate societal
interests implicated in the retrial of a defendant. Wade v. Hunter42 caused
the Supreme Court to focus on whether the double jeopardy clause pre-
cluded retrial when a trial failed to end in a final judgment.4' The Court
recognized that there may be circumstances in which a trial already begun
could not be completed, but held that absent compelling circumstances such
an event should not deny courts the power to retry defendants." It reasoned
that the primary purpose of the legal system is to protect society from those
found guilty of crimes and, therefore, the courts should be allowed to
achieve that purpose notwithstanding the defendant's rights under the
double jeopardy clause.45 Addressing again the importance of balancing so-
cietal interests in double jeopardy cases, the Court in United States v. Tateo
46
indicated that abstract legal principles must not interfere with the sound
Id. See also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 710 (1969), supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
39. Lange, 85 U.S. at 175.
40. Id.
41. Id. In Fitzgerald, the court distinguished Lange by pointing out that Lange had been
sentenced to the maximum penalty whereas Fitzgerald had received a sentence of 15-45
months under a statute that allowed for 15 years. The court refused to interpret Lange as an
absolute bar to adding a sentence upon reconviction. Fitzgerald, 472 A.2d at 54.
42. 336 U.S. 684 (1949). Wade involved the court-martial of an American soldier in Ger-
many in 1945. The first court-martial proceeding was discontinued because the prosecution
did not have available necessary witnesses. The case was then transferred to another location
and a second proceeding was held at which time the defendant argued that double jeopardy
had attached. His double jeopardy plea was rejected and he was found guilty and dishonorably
discharged. The Supreme Court subsequently decided that the double jeopardy clause did not
bar the defendant's second court-martial. Id. at 688-89.
43. Id. at 685-89. The first trial was not completed because the witnesses were not
accessible.
44. Id. Accord United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 98-100 (where the defendant seeks to
terminate the trial, an appeal by the government is not barred by the double jeopardy clause).
45. Wade, 336 U.S. at 689.
46. In Tateo, the defendant pled guilty to four counts of a five-count indictment. 377 U.S.
at 464. As a result of this plea, he was sentenced to 22 1/2 years in prison. Id. Tateo's
conviction was subsequently set aside by another judge. 214 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
That judge determined Tateo did not possess the freedom to make a voluntary plea because of
the cumulative impact of the trial testimony, the judge's expressed view that if Tateo was
1286 [Vol. 34:1281
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administration of justice. The Court reasoned that the right of a defendant
to be provided a fair trial must coexist with the right of society to punish
those whose guilt is clear. In dicta, other Supreme Court cases47 have reiter-
ated that there is a societal interest in bringing to trial those accused of a
crime.
Congress has also recognized the importance of obtaining and recording
valid convictions through its promulgation of federal criminal statutes. For
instance, the Dangerous Special Offender Statute was promulgated to en-
hance punishment for three types of defendants: (1) the habitual offender;
(2) the professional criminal; and (3) upper echelon organized crime
figures.48 The statute permits prosecutors to request an enhanced penalty of
up to a maximum of twenty-five years in prison.4 9 Since passage of the stat-
ute, the Supreme Court has upheld its constitutionality by finding that its
procedures do not violate the double jeopardy clause.50 Moreover, Congress
recently has provided for enhanced penalties in three areas of the Compre-
hensive Crime Control Act of 1984.51 Certain provisions of the District of
found guilty by the jury he would impose a life sentence, and the advice by counsel that he
would probably be found guilty. Id.
For a contrasting result see Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), where the Court
held that because the defendant had been convicted of a lesser offense included in the original
indictment, he could only be retried for the offense for which he was found guilty. Id. at 189.
For example, a defendant cannot be retried for first degree murder when he has been convicted
of the lesser offense of second degree murder. Id.
47. E.g., Scott, 437 U.S. at 100; United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 121 (1966).
48. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-3578 (1982). Section 3575 was repealed, effective November 1,
1985; however, enhanced penalty statutes have been added to the Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act of 1984. See infra note 51.
49. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1001(a), 84 Stat. 948 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)
(1982 & Supp. 1 1983)).
50. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 135. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun noted that
the Dangerous Special Offender statute "represents a considered legislative attempt to attack a
specific problem in our criminal justice system [which is] the tendency on the part of some trial
judges 'to mete out light sentences in cases involving organized crime management person-
nel.'" Id. at 142 (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENF'T AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY 203 (1967)).
51. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (1984). Part D of chapter X amends 18
U.S.C. § 924(c), imposing a mandatory penalty without the possibility of parole or probation
on anyone who uses or carries a firearm during, and in relation to, a federal crime of violence.
On a first conviction, the amended section requires a five-year prison sentence, and with re-
spect to a second or subsequent conviction, it mandates a 10-year prison sentence. 18
U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West Supp. 1985). Thus, the importance of a conviction under § 924(c) is
to determine whether the defendant falls into the 10-year mandatory sentence category upon a
second conviction. Id.
Part E of chapter X amends ch. 44 of title 18 by adding § 929. That new section mandates
an increased punishment of at least five years in prison for those who commit crimes of vio-
lence while carrying a handgun loaded with armor-piercing ammunition. The result of this
section and § 924(c) is that a defendant may receive consecutive mandatory sentences totalling
1985] 1287
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Columbia Code also include sentence enhancement provisions.52 Many of
these statutes were formulated to achieve a greater degree of consistency in
sentencing, especially in cases involving both repeat offenders and dangerous
special offenders.
53
II. FITZGERALD V. UNITED STATES" PUBLIC POLICY AS A
JUSTIFICATION FOR GOVERNMENT RETRIAL OF DEFENDANTS
WHO HAVE SATISFIED THEIR SENTENCES
In Fitzgerald v. United States,54 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
was confronted with a novel factual situation. Fitzgerald is novel because
Supreme Court cases55 dealing with the double punishment issue had ad-
dressed only unsatisfied sentences, whereas this case involved a fully satisfied
sentence. The specific issue in Fitzgerald was whether a defendant could be
retried after he had completely served his sentence and had been uncondi-
tionally released from parole. In arguing that he could not be retried, the
defendant relied primarily on double jeopardy clause dicta from two
Supreme Court cases 6 and a U.S. District Court case.57 The District of
at least 10 years in addition to the sentence for the underlying offense. 18 U.SC.A. § 929
(West Supp. 1985). These sections underline the importance of a conviction on a serious or
repeat offender's record.
Chapter XVIII, known as the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, increases the penalty for
the already existing offense under 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 1202, of a felon who possesses a weapon.
If a defendant is convicted under § 1202, and has three prior convictions (state or federal) for
robbery or burglary or both, the new statute allows a mandatory prison sentence of not less
than 15 years and a discretionary fine of up to $25,000. 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 1202 (West Supp.
1985).
52. The following provisions of the congressionally legislated District of Columbia Code
consider a conviction to be of importance in determining the treatment to be meted out by the
criminal justice system: (1) D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-104(a) (1981 & Supp. 1985) (repeat offend-
ers may receive a more severe punishment upon a second or third conviction); (2) D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 3202(a)(2), 24-203(b) (1981 & Supp. 1985) (minimum mandatory sentences required
where defendant is convicted of serious crime after being convicted for a violent crime); (3)
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3203(2) (1981 & Supp. 1985) (convicted felons are denied the right to
possess certain firearms); (4) D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1322(a)(1), (2), 23-1322(c)(3), (d) (1981
& Supp. 1985) (accused who has previously been convicted of a violent crime may be detained
pretrial); (5) D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1981 & Supp. 1985) (a defendant may be impeached
with a past felony conviction once he testifies at his trial).
53. See, e.g., United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 118 (1980) (where a federal
dangerous special offender statute allowed for an increased sentence upon the conviction of
such a "dangerous" offender). It has been observed that sentencing is the one area of the
criminal justice system most in need of reform. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:
LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
54. 472 A.2d 52 (D.C. 1984).
55. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
56. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116
(1966).
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Columbia Court of Appeals found the defendant's argument unpersuasive
after examining the long history of the double jeopardy clause5" and consid-
ering the societal importance of convicting those found guilty of crimes.59
The Fitzgerald court found that the defendant could be retried because the
government's interests in the case were not limited to punishment alone.
60
The court reached that conclusion after examining the policy considerations
found in Wade v. Hunter.61 The Court of Appeals reasoned that it was bene-
ficial both from a governmental and a societal standpoint to insure that indi-
viduals guilty of crimes be identified.62 Citing various District of Columbia
Code provisions enacted by Congress that attach important collateral conse-
quences to convictions, the court noted the expressed congressional concern
with having valid convictions entered and made a permanent part of a de-
fendant's criminal record. 63 Indeed, a prerequisite to the use of most sen-
tence enhancement statutes is an undisputed record of at least one prior
conviction. Thus, an argument against retrial based upon the double punish-
ment protections of the double jeopardy clause is less persuasive now in the
wake of increasingly popular sentence enhancement statutes.
Guided by the holding in North Carolina v. Pearce,"M the Fitzgerald court
acknowledged that upon retrial the judge is restricted to the sentence origi-
nally imposed unless a harsher one is justified by the defendant's "identifi-
able conduct" between the first and the second sentencing.65 The impact of
Fitzgerald does not rest, however, with the court's view that a longer sen-
tence may ultimately be imposed, for that is merely a restatement of settled
double jeopardy clause principles. Rather, Fitzgerald is significant because
the court's rationale permitting retrial is based solely on the "governmental
and societal" interests involved. The interests articulated by the court are
two-fold: 1) insuring that those guilty of crimes are punished,66 and 2) in-
57. Wolff, 497 F. Supp. at 122.
58. See supra notes 27-47 and accompanying text.
59. Fitzgerald, 472 A.2d at 53-54.
60. Id. at 53.
61. 336 U.S. 684 (1949); see United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966)
62. Fitzgerald, 472 A.2d at 53-54. Specifically, the court said the collateral consequences
attending conviction for certain crimes "are intended to encourage those who have been con-
victed. . . to observe the precepts of the criminal code. As such, they inure to the public's
benefit and justify the government's authority to retry [the defendant]." Id. at 54.
63. See supra note 52. For example, repeat offenders may be sentenced more severely
after being convicted a second or third time. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-104, -104(a). Addition-
ally, in the annotation to § 22-104, the purpose of that section is stated as being to give new
sentencing alternatives to judges to "protect society" as well as to rehabilitate the defendant.
See Smith v. United States, 304 A.2d 28 (D.C.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1114 (1973).
64. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
65. Fitzgerald, 472 A.2d at 54.
66. Id. at 54.
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suring that those convictions are recorded for possible future use in conjunc-
tion with sentencing enhancement statutes.67 Therefore, it is the court's
unusual rationale, which focuses almost entirely on the governmental inter-
ests involved, that sets Fitzgerald apart from prior decisions. The court is
primarily concerned with the collateral consequences that attach to criminal
convictions in order to protect the viability and insure the utilization of sen-
tence enhancement statutes. Focusing on the governmental interests, the
court virtually brushes aside considerations normally applied in double jeop-
ardy cases such as the heavy burden on a defendant who is twice placed in
jeopardy or the unfairness of double punishment.6"
In its opinion, the court attempts to deemphasize the importance of "pun-
ishing" those guilty of crimes when it reasons that the government's interests
are not limited to punishment.69 It is, however, essentially focusing on pun-
ishment when it permits retrial of a defendant who may face greater penal-
ties under a sentencing enhancement statute upon a later conviction. In
sum, the court decided that while a defendant may not necessarily be given a
harsher sentence on retrial, he, nevertheless, may be retried because the con-
viction itself may prove to be important in future trials and other sentencing
proceedings.70 The legislative mandate that a repeat violent offender receive
a greater sentence in the future because of past misdeeds must lead immuta-
bly to an expansion of the rights of society and a lessening of the tradition-
ally-recognized rights of the defendant in the delicate double jeopardy
balancing process. The Fitzgerald decision is apparently the first of many
that will follow in the wake of such "get-tough" legislation.
In Fitzgerald, the court primarily focused on the collateral consequences
attaching upon conviction for a serious crime.71 Where a serious crime is not
at issue, however, it is unclear how the court would treat the double punish-
ment question, especially in circumstances in which a sentence has been fully
satisfied.
III. CONCLUSION
In Fitzgerald, the court turned to public policy and legislative considera-
tions in overruling the defendant's double jeopardy argument and in decid-
ing that there are benefits to society when a person guilty of criminal activity
is convicted and a permanent record is made of that conviction. This result
is directly related to the existence of sentence enhancement statutes. Conse-
67. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 3.
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quently, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in future double jeop-
ardy cases will be focusing less on double punishment and more on the
significance of a conviction. Because identifying career criminals is of in-
creasing importance to society, the decision in Fitzgerald may be only the
precursor of a trend in which the courts gradually shift their double jeopardy
focus away from the traditional rights of the defendant toward society's
right to be protected.
Vickie R. Olafson

